A review of state-associated incidents in cyberspace over the past decade reveals that over two thirds of these involved actors within the Asia-Pacific, often occurring in the context of politico-economic disputes. These activities, ranging from attempts at espionage to coercion, in all appearance appears to confirm the domain's increasing strategic value. But upon closer inspection, only half of these have resulted in meeting their political objectives. Moreover, these have involved notable regional powers employing relatively unsophisticated tools and tactics in cyberspace. This challenges the prevailing notion that cyberspace provides an asymmetric advantage for middling and/or weak powers due to its low cost of entry and the increasing technological dependence of targets. With growing tensions in the Asia-Pacific, the need to better understand the strategic utilization of this domain is paramount. In so doing, this paper argues that coercive success in cyberspace is not determined solely by an aggressor's technological prowess but depends crucially on appropriate force employment and an understanding of the domain's unique geography. Through the analysis of the Stuxnet operation, the paper demonstrates that careful consideration of these factors may better account for the success or failure of coercion in the domain.
Cyberspace and Failed Promises
The appearance of stat-associated cyber operations in conjunction with disputes in the physical domain has become commonplace over the past decade. As heralded by Arquilla and Ronfeldt's prescient article in 1994, the perceived strategic utility of cyberspace appears to have encouraged state actors to employ it as a coercive tool aimed at shifting an adversary's behavior in their favor (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993) . Prominent cases such as the Estonian Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) in 2007 and the discovery of Stuxnet aimed at Iranian nuclear centrifuges in 2010 have buoyed initial claims of the advantages provided by operations in cyberspace.
On the one hand, while cyber operations are indeed on the rise, they have proven to be far less effective than initially perceived as coercive cyber operations have succeeded less than threepercent (3%) of the time (Valeriano & Maness, 2014) . Furthermore, despite increased dependence on cyberspace in support of political, economic, and military objectives, advanced cyber operations that threaten these have failed to inflict lasting damage capable of altering the balance of power. Overall, the utility of cyber operations as a means of influencing state behavior and policy appears to be inadequate relative to conventional (e.g. physical military force, economic sanctions, etc.) means. A paradox then exists between the prevailing "cyber revolution" thesis that proposes an evolution in the exercise of state power by means of cyberspace and that of the empirical evidence calls for further investigation of the causal dynamics that lead to the successful use of coercive cyber operations.
While several factors exist that influence the outcome of coercion (Pape, 1996; Schelling, 2008) , this paper grounds its analysis on the unique characteristics of cyberspace and on variations of actor perceptions towards the domain and its influence over coercive operations. This view stands in contrast with the predominant notion that increasing dependence to and continued vulnerability of cyberspace alone leads to successful coercion. To demonstrate this proposed framework, a plausibility probe is conducted on a representative case. The objective of which is not to discredit previous arguments that support the predominant account, but rather, to offer a theoretically grounded argument to account for events in this domain.
In so doing the paper proceeds as follows. The succeeding section offers a brief overview of the concept of coercion as it applies to the traditional domains of air, sea, and land. This sets the tone for the succeeding section that presents how the current framework applies vis-à-vis the unique geography of cyberspace. Furthermore, this section walks the reader through the logic of coercion in cyberspace rooted in current strategic thought. After which, the paper offers an alternative framework grounded on perceptive differences with regards to the importance of cyberspace as a key factor for the success of coercive operations. It is in this section that the core arguments are presented. Following this, the methodology employed is established that allows for the case in the succeeding section to be analyzed. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the initial results and the possible direction that subsequent investigations may take.
ability to force an adversary to re-assess the cost of non-compliance versus the benefits of yielding to coercive demands.
Although the exact terminologies associated with coercion is open to debate, these activities are viewed as functions of time relative to an adversary's actions: deterrence or compellence. Deterrence is enacted prior to an adversary engaging in an action that is deemed unfavorable by the coercer. Deterrence attempts to prevent a change in the status-quo by threatening costs should an adversary deviate from their current behavior. This presents deterrence as less costly and easier to attain as an adversary has little to no sunk costs involved and is primarily concerned with costs emerging from non-compliance and the loss of future benefits. In contrast, compellence aims to alter an adversary's current behavior and is reactive in nature. Unlike deterrence, compellence incurs more costs as an adversary is not only concerned with foregoing future benefits but forfeits the benefits of resources invested up to this point. Furthermore, the potential cost of non-compliance needs to be assessed as well. Consequently, compellence is thought to be more difficult than deterrence (Schaub, 2004; Schelling, 2008) .
Apart from timing, coercion is also differentiated based on its intended recipient(s) and may manifest itself as denial or punishment strategies (Pape, 1996) . The former requires inflicting or threatening costs to prevent an adversary from attaining their political or strategic objectives. This entails targeting assets or infrastructure critical that support these goals. In contrast, punishment strategies aim to increase the cost and/or risk to the civilian population by targeting them directly in the hopes of increasing civilian pressure on government.
Although the underlying rationale to both compellence and deterrence applies to cyberspace, special considerations unique to the domain need to be accounted for. Specifically, the characteristics of cyberspace dictates that compellence is more feasible than deterrence within the domain. The increasing integration of technology into day-to-day life, and more importantly in crucial services, offers adversaries targets for compellent threats. Disabling critical infrastructure, either civilian or military, allows for both punishment and denial strategies. In contrast, deterrence is much harder to employ as this requires the demonstration of capabilities. Within cyberspace, exposing one's technical capabilities allows an adversary to quickly study and develop countermeasures against future threats and thus mitigating the threat of punishment which forms the foundation of deterrence.
Yet despite these shortcomings, the underlying premises of coercion is still applicable to this virtual domain. As such, the succeeding section furthers this argument and links the unique geography of this domain with the predicted success of coercive cyber operations.
Geography, Interdependence, and Coercion
In lieu of the abstracted nature through which most interact with cyberspace, it is reasonable to perceive it as a monolithic and featureless space. While this may have arisen from the need to provide an abstraction to enable its efficient use, this is not the actual case (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009) . While a consensus on the true nature of cyberspace remains elusive, the components that form the unique geography of the domain may be divided into three (3) primary layers: Physical, Syntactic, and Semantic (see Figure 1) (Libicki, 2010) . The Physical layer refers to the underlying infrastructure that support the generation, transmission, and storage of electro-magnetic signals (e.g. servers, cables, computers, etc.). In contrast, the Syntactic layer is comprised of codes and protocols that enable the proper construction, manipulation, and transportation data. Despite the popular notion that cyberspace exists independently of the physical domain, it is only at this layer that such a notion is validated. Finally, the Semantic layer allows for the transformation of the data into meaningful information in support of human endeavors (e.g. retail, communication, etc.) (Libicki, 2010) . The conversion of electro-magnetic signals into data that is then interpreted into useful information forms the construct that is cyberspace and is thought to be increasingly significant to not only individuals but states as well in support of their strategic interests. As observed by Starr, cyberspace is increasingly becoming an enabler for instruments of national power (Starr, 2009) . It is through this logic of interdependency that the coercive potential of cyberspace begins to take shape.
However, despite efforts to secure this domain from threats against its confidentiality, integrity, and availability, it is thought to be continually at risk. Compounding this challenge is its underlying complexity that demands specialized knowledge to manage and has led to the framing of cyberspace as a vulnerable and unknowable domain with the potential of inadvertent disaster (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009 ). The perceived vulnerability stems from the interdependent and interconnected operation of its underlying components that increases the possibility of flaws in both design and operation. Furthermore, its complexity presents additional challenges in addressing these vulnerabilities to the extent that completely mitigating these is highly unlikely. This inability to identify and remedy each and every issue introduces a sense of inevitability such that should an adversary be able to identify an overlooked vulnerability, the domain itself is open to compromise (Dunn-Cavelty, 2013).
As states increasingly become dependent on cyberspace for their strategic interests, its vulnerable and unknowable nature may lead to an inevitable compromise that allows an aggressor to threaten or inflict costs, possibly threatening strategic interests (Dunn-Cavelty, 2013; Gandhi et al., 2011) . Furthermore, the coercive potential of cyber operations is enhanced by the offensive advantage that is thought to exist within cyberspace (Saltzman, 2013) .
Plainly stated, an offensive advantage signals a shift in favor of offensive actions relative to defense. Such imbalances have often followed the emergence of new military technologies that provide aggressors a decisive advantage. In cyberspace, this is manifested in both the mobility and damage potential of cyber operations because of the interdependence that exists between the different layers of the domain and between cyberspace and a state's strategic interests. The mobility of an operation is manifested in its ability to adversely affect the different layers of the domain. The effects of an operation against the Syntactic later, for instance, can percolate up to the Semantic layer which ultimately influences strategic capabilities (Saltzman, 2013) . Similarly, the damage potential of cyber operations follows a similar logic. Damage inflicted at the lower levels can rise to higher levels and increases in severity as it rises (see Error! Reference source not found. Unfortunately, this logic of threatening or inflicting costs against an adversary's strategic interests through cyberspace has not borne much success despite the exercise of advanced capabilities that meet the above requirements. Estonia in 2007 experienced an operation aimed at these components that lasted for over two (2) weeks. Despite this unprecedented event, the massive DDoS attack did not lead to any behavioral changes on the part of the target. Similarly, the operation against Iran's nuclear centrifuges that saw the first case of a "weaponized" malware only led them to harden their resolve and develop their own cyber capabilities in turn (Healey, 2016) . Interestingly, cases with outcomes that diverge from the above predictions challenge the assumptions grounded by this existing framework.
Vulnerability and Perspective
While the empirical evidence does indeed indicate increased dependence on cyberspace in conjunction with the continued presence of exploitable vulnerabilities, the limitations of existing explanations for coercive success rests on a generic perception of the domain. While the mechanism described above is logically sound, its assumption that cyberspace is valued uniformly across states is unfounded. In the context of coercion, understanding the value placed on certain assets relative to their strategic importance is crucial for success. As noted by Pape, the successful application of coercive threats or action rests on the ability to discern the vulnerabilities of a target such that its execution hinders an adversary's ability to meet its political and/or military objectives (Pape, 1996) . This suggests that an aggressor must have knowledge of how an adversary values its assets. With respect to cyberspace, little has been said regarding variations in the perception. These differences, however, are apparent in definitions of cyberspace across states. Russia, for instance, views it as the "area of activity related to the formation, creation, transformation, transmission, use and storage of the information affecting...the individual and social consciousness..." (NATO CCDCOE, 2016) . In contrast, the United States treats it as "a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data..." (NATO CCDCOE, 2016) . Although similarities exist between the two -notably the emphasis on technology -a key difference lies in the fact that the former endows it with a degree of social significance.
Variations such as these suggest not only differing views as to the nature of the domain, but the possibility of incompatible valuations between actors.
To account for the emergence of these differences, Hare initially applied Buzan's model to map state characteristics against possible threats to cyberspace. Initially, the model takes into consideration (military) power (P) and socio-political cohesion (SPC) as key determinants.
Hare argues that states with high levels of SPC are generally affected by cyber operations aimed at the Syntactic and Semantic layers -with an emphasis on the former. This is due to their dependence on cyberspace for economic stability and communication. In contrast, those with low levels of SPC, are consistently vulnerable to de-stabilizing political actions which are associated primarily with the Semantic layer and the manipulation of information. The role of power in these cases is to broaden or narrow the range of vulnerabilities expected to include those that may not directly impact the interest of the state (i.e. private individuals) (Hare, 2010) . CSOs (N-CSO) engage in actions that limit the flow of information to ensure that the interests and stability of the regime is not threatened challenged. State initiatives such as censorship, policing social-media, and the like are representative of such (Rivera, 2015) . With respect to both, disrupting these objectives or threatening their successful implementation may negatively impact the strategic interests of states. Consequently, this meets the requirements of coercive success as previously mentioned.
Socio-Political Cohesion

CSO
The arguments presented in this section point to two critical differences with respect to the prevailing understanding surrounding coercive cyber operations. First, while states are indeed increasingly becoming more dependent on the domain, the success of coercion rests on threatening the appropriate CSO of an adversary. Second, while identifying the appropriate CSO is indeed crucial, each type is reliant on a specific layer of cyberspace. Consequently, the success of coercion rests on operations that adversely affects the appropriate layer of cyberspace relative to the CSO.
With these propositions, two competing accounts for the outcome of coercion in cyberspace are surfaced. On the one hand, coercion may be achieved using advanced capabilities that exploit the unpredictable yet interdependent nature of cyberspace. On the other, success is a function of correctly acknowledging how the domain is valued by an adversary and exercising threats or force accordingly.
Design, Operationalization, Selection
Although support for the alternative account presented herein is best served by generalizing its findings across all cases of cyber coercion, the lack of data to allow for a large-n study continues to plague research in cyberspace. Consequently, the paper adopts a design based on a representative case to demonstrate the feasibility of the alternative propositions. At this point it is crucial to mention that the results presented are not definitive, but rather, serve to demonstrate the applicability of this line of reasoning.
Apart from the overall design, the operationalization of the independent and dependent variables is equally significant. There is no generally accepted measure for either Mobility or Damage Potential. Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), due to their uniquely tailored capabilities, specific target set, and enduring nature exhibit high levels of both Mobility and Damage Potential. Consequently, coercive cyber operations that employ APTs are treated as possessing these attributes. Identifying the CSO of an adversary, on the other hand, involves determining whether the SPC of the said actor is either high or low. High levels suggest a Positive CSO while low values are indicative of a Negative CSO. For these values, the paper employs Rivera's dataset that identifies states with high or low levels of SPC based on the Freedom House Index (Rivera, 2015) . Finally, the affected layer of cyberspace is specified based on the characteristics of their respective CSOs. As mentioned previously, P-CSOs focus primarily on the availability and flow of information. This suggests that the Syntactic layer is crucial. In contrast, N-CSOs depend on the manipulation or theft of information. While these may also involve the Syntactic layer, it is ultimately control over the Semantic layer that leads to success. With respect to the dependent variable, the outcome of coercion, the paper refers to the Objective Success field present in the Dyadic Cyber Incident Dataset (DCID) that indicates whether the objective of the initiator (e.g. Disruption, Espionage, or Coercion) was met (Valeriano & Maness, 2014) .
Having considered the overall design and variable operationalization, the remainder of the section is dedicated to the case selection. As the paper focuses on state-to-state interactions in cyberspace, the following constraints are placed on selecting the appropriate case. Only instances of state-based or state-endorsed operations are chosen. Only operations targeting state-owned and state-operated assets are included. Operations that affect government and military systems are thus in scope while those involving private industries are excluded. Compellent coercive cyber operations are considered. This restriction to compellent activity is in place as compellence is generally thought of as being more difficult. If the arguments of the prevailing explanation are valid, then the use of highly mobile and damaging operations should make such threats more credible. Finally, cases are selected such that they are representative of the prevailing framework rooted in increased dependence and overall vulnerability of cyberspace. Should this argument suffice, there ought to be little that the proposed alternative may add to the analysis of the case.
Selection and Analysis
With respect to the requirements for mobility and damage potential, the case of Stuxnet in 2010 is illustrative. Stuxnet -dubbed as the first "weaponized" malware -employed six (6) different vulnerabilities, had the ability to jump the air gap, and could inflict physical damage. Its employment to disrupt Iran's nuclear programme fits into the narrative of cyberspace as a threat to an adversary's strategic interests. However, Stuxnet had done little to disrupt Iran's nuclear ambitions. Later analysis revealed that while its unique feature-set endowed it with significant potential, the actual damage inflicted had not exceeded that of normal operational breakdown (De Falco, 2012; Iasiello, 2013; Lindsay, 2013) .
While the post-incident analysis concluded that the overall physical damage caused by Stuxnet was minimal, it is unlikely that Iranian authorities would have concluded with absolute certainty that no other operation was presently threatening the remainder of its cyber infrastructure. Although details regarding the decision-making process at the time is unavailable, this argument is supported by subsequent actions of the regime. First, it is doubtful that Iranian authorities overestimated their own defensive capabilities as well as underestimated the capabilities of the suspected aggressors -later to be attributed to the United States and Israel. The fact that external expertise had been sought out to contain Stuxnet suggests limited capabilities on the part of the regime (De Falco, 2012) . Furthermore, despite significant investment in the development of their own cyber capabilities (Ward, 2008) , the need for external assistance hints at not only Stuxnet's complexity, but also surfaces the vulnerability of Iranian cyberspace. Second, if the authorities had indeed felt the attack to be inconsequential, then what need would there have been for their aggressive pursuit of cyber capabilities post 2010?
This rationale suggests that Iran, despite the outcome of Stuxnet, still viewed the operation as significant enough to cause a reassessment of its capabilities. However, not so crucial as to alter its behavior with respect to its nuclear programme. If coercion aims to influence behavior by threatening costs, then it appears that the consequences of Stuxnet had not crossed a threshold. This casts doubt on the validity of the prevailing arguments calling for the use of highly mobile and damaging cyber operations. At the time, Stuxnet represented an advancement in cyber capabilities. One must inquire as to what activities that threaten cyberspace would have been significant enough to compel Iran to change its behavior. The key to answering this question rests on an understanding of how the Iranian regime perceives the domain.
In March 2012, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a call for the creation of a Supreme Council of Cyberspace noting that "dramatic effects" that the growing use of these technologies has had on the social dimension of human life (Khamenei, 2012) . After some time, General Behrouz Esbati of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp noted in an interview that cyberspace is composed of three layer: hardware, software, and "brainware". While the former two are selfexplanatory, the later, he argues, refers to the "establishment of goals in cyberspace, activity related to meaning and content, and types of analysis occurring in the cyber domain" (Bucala & Pendelton, 2015) . This definition allows the notion of "brainware" to be equated with that of the Semantic layer. Moreover, the general's views relative to his position suggests the importance of this component with respect to Iranian cyberspace.
Esbati later notes that "the creation and engineering of communications in the Internet can be turned into a threat; for example it is possible for you to Google something and for another individual to manage the meaning of the search results." The need to manage information cannot be attributed solely to the general as other elements of the Supreme Cyberspace Council are also required to exercise similar tasks (Bucala & Pendelton, 2015) . Furthermore, this suggests the presence of a Negative-CSO in effect within Iran. This is not entirely surprising given the level of Socio-Political Cohesion within Iran and the nature of the regime itself.
The preceding arguments suggest the possibility that loss of control over information reflected by the Semantic layer challenges the objectives of the regime. With respect to the paper's propositions, the coercion of Iran through cyberspace would likely succeed if aimed at hindering their ability to meet their N-CSO through operations aimed at the disrupting control of the Semantic layer. This vulnerability is further reinforced by events prior to Stuxnet reflected by the establishment of Internet censorship in response to political dissent in the early years of the 21 st century and in the initiative to develop its own internal network that emerged after the 2009 Green/Twitter Revolution (Golkar, 2011; Rahimi, 2003) . These examples support the argument that an understanding of the adversary's perception of cyberspace and its critical components provides insight with respect to the nature of cyber operations required to achieve coercive success in the domain.
Consequently, it is important to note that predicating the success of coercion on an understanding of the adversary's vulnerability based on their objectives is not unique to this man-made domain. Pape stresses the necessity of matching coercive threats with an adversary's actions and objectives. Skillful technical execution does not guarantee success if it does not introduce risk for the target. In the case of Vietnam, Operations Rolling Thunder and Linebacker I and II were properly executed and maximized the full technological potential of the US Airforce. However, the former failed to achieve its coercive goals as it was directed at assets of little value given the objectives of the adversary at the time. In contrast, the latter proved fruitful as it placed pressure on the adversary by threatening assets that it had deemed important at the time relative to its goals -conventional warfare directed at South Vietnam (Pape, 1996) .
Conclusion
The adoption of cyber capabilities as an instrument of national policy is well underway. More importantly, the increasing use of cyber operations as a coercive tool is manifesting itself in several long standing and emergent inter-state disputes. Unfortunately, the conceptualization of the dynamics of cyber coercion has yet to mature beyond speculations built on a sense of fear and dread that is encouraged by increasing societal dependencies on these technologies. While there may be some merit in the execution of coercive cyber operations that are fully able to exploit the interdependence between technology and strategic interests, the threat of systemic collapse, on its own, does not result in success. Interestingly, it appears that operations that are simpler and constrain the amount of damage they cause have proven to be the most fruitful.
This deviation from the expectations of the "cyber revolution" thesis calls for the need to further asses the strategic utility of coercive cyber operations. To this end, the paper presents an alternative account built on both the unique geography of cyberspace and varying perceptions of its importance. The paper argues that careful consideration of these features is more likely to lead to coercive success rather than outright force that is manifested by highly mobile and damaging actions.
While the results presented herein are by no means definitive, this study does raise the need to reassess events in cyberspace in a more theoretical light and emphasizes the necessity of evaluating the applicability of existing theories to study events in this domain. Despite its novelty, the study of cyberspace and its uses should not be built on hype over its characteristics, but rather informed by empirical evidence framed through the lens of applicable theory.
